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Economists largely neglected systemic risk in the financial sector. This column discusses how 
governments should gather data about systemic risk and assess its implications. It says the 
new European Systemic Risk Board is far from the ideal – it is too big, too homogeneous, and 
lacks independence.  
Economists have been widely reviled in the popular press for failing to predict the current financial 
crisis. To some extent, this criticism is unfair. As David K. Levine (2009) has argued, future economic 
outcomes are functions of future fundamental random variables. Even if economists could perfectly 
model the world and even if they knew all of the potential fundamental random variables and their 
distributions, they could at most describe the statistical distribution of future economic outcomes. 
However, even if economists could not have predicted the timing of the current collapse, it might be 
argued that they should have realised the extent of the systemic risk in the financial sector.  
If economists had properly assessed the systemic risk in the global financial system in early 
2007, the vulnerability of financial institutions would have been recognised, and it would 
have been understood that if events triggered the collapse of just one or a few important 
financial firms, then an entire national, or even the international, financial system could be 
endangered. Given the importance of the financial system to the real economy’s 
infrastructure, the danger of a damaging or even catastrophic blow to the real economy would 
have been seen. 
Yet, few – if any – economists sounded a widely heard alarm on this point. In the period prior 
to the credit crisis of August 2007, many economists voiced concerns about the rise in US 
house prices and the size of global imbalances. Not many, however, argued that systemic risk 
was excessively high in the financial sector. One reason for this is that systemic risk is not yet 
well understood. Another reason is that, while housing and balance of payments data is 
widely available, few economists knew that financial firms had become so leveraged or 
comprehended the nature of the real-estate-backed assets that these firms held. Finally, most 
economists had little incentive to analyse systemic risk; they were rewarded for doing other 
things. Identifying systemic risk in the financial sector will require having the data to 
measure it and rewarding some body of research economists and related professionals for 
spotting it. 
Gathering data on systemic risk 
In his testimony to the US House of Representatives, Andrew Lo describes how the first 
condition can be met. He proposes setting up an independent agency to collect, organise, 
analyse, store, and protect data on the market prices of the on- and off-balance sheet assets 
and liabilities of all US financial firms, including those in the shadow banking sector. Such 
data would allow an assessment of how leveraged and liquid the US banking system is. It 
would allow economists to assess the correlation of asset prices and estimate portfolios’ 
sensitivity to changes in economic conditions. 
 The Eurozone should also set up such an agency, although, as Lo emphasises, collecting the 
raw data, maintaining it, and turning it into something usable would not be easy or 
inexpensive. It would require a change in the rules so that all financial entities are required to 
report their balance sheet positions. As many financial firms are multinational enterprises, 
international coordination, say through the BIS or IMF, would desirable, but that may be 
politically difficult.  
In addition to being costly, it should be noted that the benefits of such a systemic risk data set 
are limited. The data will, at most, allow policy makers to observe the symptoms of financial 
vulnerability. Using a systemic risk data set in an early warning system is no substitute for 
sensible economic policy and good supervision and regulation. Also, as previously 
mentioned, systemic risk is not yet well understood, and this creates obvious difficulties in 
interpreting the data.  
In particular, a key feature of a crisis caused by systemic risk factors is the domino-like 
collapse of a chain of financial institutions after the demise of a just one or a few. This may 
be because of the size of the first institutions to go, or it may be because they were too 
interconnected to fail without damaging the entire system. Current efforts to measure 
interconnectedness typically employ network theory. Soramäki et al. (2007), for example, use 
a network map of the US Fedwire interbank payment system to look at “connectedness” in 
the US financial system. But, neither size nor conventional connectedness may be necessary 
for a financial crisis to propagate. Instead, a new or old-style bank run or speculative attack in 
one market may make a similar run or attack a focal outcome or, as recent research by 
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2009) demonstrates, a tiny amount of contagious 
adverse selection can shut down a market.  
Given the harm a financial crisis can inflict, even the limited benefits of a systemic risk data 
set make it worth the cost. However, once it is available, the dataset cannot be used 
mechanistically. One reason is that a change in a variable may be unimportant on its own but 
dangerous in combination with other factors. An example, due to Lo (2009), is that the 
greater availability of refinancing opportunities for homeowners appears benign, but in 
combination with higher real estate prices and higher interest rates, it can lead to 
householders synchronising equity withdrawals via refinancing and becoming increasingly 
leveraged with no way of reducing their leverage should house prices drop. The result can be 
a wave of defaults and foreclosures across the economy. Thus, along with an agency to 
collect and manage the data, the Eurozone must have a systemic risk assessment committee 
to interpret this and other relevant data, in light of the current macroeconomic and regulatory 
and supervisory environment. 
Designing a systemic risk assessment 
committee 
This committee should be small and diverse. I suggest that ideally it should be composed of 
five people: a macroeconomist, a microeconomist, a financial engineer, a research 
accountant, and a practitioner. The reason for the small size is that, consistent with the 
familiar jokes, it is a stylised fact that the output of committees is not as good as one would 
expect, given their members. Process losses due to coordination problems, motivational 
losses, and difficulty sharing information are well documented in the social psychology 
literature; not everyone can speak at once; information is a public good and gathering it 
requires effort; no one wants to make a fool of themselves in front of their co-members. As 
the size of a group increases so does the pool of human resources, but motivational losses, 
coordination problems, and the potential for embarrassment become more important. The 
optimal size for a group that must solve problems or make judgements is an empirical issue, 
but it may not be much greater than five. The reason for diversity is that spotting systemic 
risk requires different types of expertise. A board composed of entirely of macroeconomists 
might, for example, see the potential for risk pooling in securitisation, whereas a 
microeconomist would see the reduced incentive to monitor loans. 
The committee should be composed of researchers outside of government bodies and 
international organisations; career concerns may stifle the incentive of a bureaucrat to express 
certain original ideas. It is of particular importance that the board not include supervisors and 
regulators. This is for two reasons. First, it is often suggested that supervisors and regulators 
can be captured by the industry that they are supposed to mind, and this may make them less 
than objective and prone to the same errors. Second, a prominent cause of the recent crisis 
was supervisory and regulatory failures, and these are more apt to be spotted and reported by 
independent observers than the perpetrators. 
Finally, it is important that the board be made sufficiently visible and prominent that a 
member’s career depends on his performance. Given the importance of the task, pay should 
be high to attract the best qualified, and the members should not have outside employment to 
distract them. 
The Eurozone has already swung into action, creating the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), set to begin this year. Unfortunately, this board, responsible for macro-prudential 
oversight of the EU financial system and for issuing risk warnings and recommendations, is 
far from the ideal. It is to be composed of the 27 EU national central bank governors, the 
ECB President and Vice-President, a Commission member and the three chairs of the new 
European Supervisory Authorities. In addition, a representative from the national supervisory 
authority of each EU country and the President of the Economic and Financial Committee 
may attend meetings of the ESRB, but may not vote. This lumbering army of 61 central 
bankers and related bureaucrats is a body clearly designed for maximum inefficiency; it is too 
big, it is too homogeneous, it lacks independence, and its members are already sufficiently 
employed.  
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